Missouri Law Review
Volume 87

Issue 1

Article 8

Winter 2022

Liability Insurance and Contractual Aspects of Settlement
Douglas R. Richmond

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Douglas R. Richmond, Liability Insurance and Contractual Aspects of Settlement, 87 MO. L. REV. ()
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss1/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Richmond: Liability Insurance and Contractual Aspects of Settlement

Liability Insurance
and Contractual Aspects of Settlement
Douglas R. Richmond*

ABSTRACT
Most civil litigation settles. Many settlements are paid by liability
insurers following the negotiation of settlement agreements by the
parties’ lawyers. Settlement agreements are contracts, and their
interpretation and enforcement are therefore governed by contract
law principles. The essential elements of a contract are offer,
acceptance, and consideration. In the liability insurance context as
elsewhere, contract disputes connected to settlements typically center
on either offer or acceptance. To be valid, a settlement offer must be
capable of acceptance. The offer must be definite, and its material
terms must be reasonably certain. When it comes to accepting a
settlement offer, the “mirror image” rule applies in this context as it
does in other contract formation scenarios. Under this rule, an
attempted acceptance that does not mirror the settlement offer in
material respects becomes a counteroffer. If the claimant declines the
counteroffer, there is no settlement. This turn of events can be
enormously consequential if the insured’s potential liability exceeds
its policy limits and litigation ensues.
The importance of achieving enforceable settlement agreements
is difficult to overstate. The law and public policy strongly favor the
settlement of disputes, and courts would be overwhelmed if most cases
went to trial. This Article examines contractual aspects of settlement
in the liability insurance context, concentrating on the elements of
offer and acceptance. It additionally addresses insurers’ ability to
reject settlement offers that are intended to facilitate later bad faith
litigation without incurring extracontractual liability.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In federal courts, only around two percent of cases go to trial.1 In
state courts, only about three percent of civil cases go to trial.2 As these
statistics indicate, most civil litigation settles. 3 Certainly, most tort cases
settle.4 The settlements in many civil cases are paid by liability insurers.5
Standard liability insurance policies grant the insurance company the right
to settle a lawsuit against an insured as the insurer deems expedient.6 An
insurance company may opt to settle a lawsuit against an insured for
several reasons. For example, the insurer may favor settlement because it
estimates that the cost of defending the litigation will exceed the cost of
settlement; because its investigation of the underlying accident revealed
that the insured likely will bear substantial liability for the accident and
the plaintiff’s claimed damages are within the liability limits of the
insured’s policy; or because there is a reasonable probability of a verdict
against the insured in excess of the policy limits and an equal chance that
the insured will be held liable for the plaintiff’s damages.7
1

CIVIL LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL 69 (2d ed. 2010) [hereinafter CIVIL
LITIG. MGMT. MANUAL].
2
LYNN LANGTON & THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL BENCH
AND JURY TRIALS IN STATE COURTS, 2005 9 (Oct. 2008 rev. Apr. 2009), available at
https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LC3-C2E2].
3
See Balducci v. Cige, 223 A.3d 1229, 1245–46 (N.J. 2020) (noting that “most
cases are resolved by settlement”); CIVIL LITIG. MGMT. MANUAL, supra note 1, at 69
(“Only a small percentage of federal civil cases are resolved by trial. Many of the
remaining cases settle.”).
4
WILLIAM T. BARKER & RONALD D. KENT, NEW APPLEMAN INSURANCE BAD
FAITH LITIGATION § 2.03[1], at 2-13 (2d ed. 2014 & Supp. 2021).
5
See generally William T. Barker, Insurer Control of Defense: Reservations of
Rights and Right to Independent Counsel, 71 DEF. COUNS. J. 16, 17 (2004) (“In a
sample of litigated cases, researchers found that insurance was involved in 80 percent,
with lawyers on both sides agreeing that the claim was completely covered in 59
percent. . . . Even when there is a genuine risk of exposure beyond the policy’s
coverage, cases are normally resolved without any payment by the insured.”).
6
See, e.g., INS. SERVS. OFFICE, INC., COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY
COVERAGE FORM (CG 00 01 04 13), at 1 (2012) (on file with author) [hereinafter ISO
CGL Policy] (“We may, at our discretion, investigate any ‘occurrence’ and settle any
claim or ‘suit’ that may result.”).
7
If an insurer unreasonably fails to settle a lawsuit against an insured within its
policy limits and there subsequently is a judgment against the insured in excess of the
policy limits, the insurer may be liable for the full amount of the judgment and other
damages under the law of bad faith. See Pinto v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 276 Cal. Rptr. 3d
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Of course, settlements are achieved by agreement between the
parties.8 Settlement agreements are contracts.9 Their interpretation and
enforcement are therefore governed by contract law principles.10
The essential elements of a contract are offer, acceptance, and
consideration.11 In the liability insurance context as elsewhere in
litigation, contract disputes connected to settlements typically center on

13, 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 2021) (“An insurer’s duty to accept a reasonable settlement offer
is not absolute. . . . An unreasonable refusal to settle may subject the insurer to liability
for the entire amount of the judgment rendered against the insured, including any
portion in excess of the policy limits.”). Courts do not presume, however, that
settlement is always the preferred strategy. Dairyland Ins. Co. v. Herman, 954 P.2d
56, 61 (N.M. 1997). An insurance company is not required to accept every policy
limits settlement offer. See Huang v. Brenson, 7 N.E.3d 729, 741 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)
(“An insurance company need not always cede to the demands of its insured to
settle.”). An insurer need not submit to extortion; it may reject an unreasonable
settlement offer within its policy limits without automatically incurring
extracontractual liability. Id. (quoting LaRotunda v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 408 N.E.2d
928, 935–36 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)). “An insurer does not act in bad faith where it
honestly believes and has cause to believe that any probable liability will be less than
the policy limits.” Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Markel Ins. Co., No. CV 18-456-R,
2018 WL 5095267, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2018); see also Gruber v. Est. of
Marshall, 482 P.3d 612, 619 (Kan. Ct. App. 2021) (“The insurer does not act in bad
faith if it honestly believes, and has good cause to believe, that any probable liability
will be less than policy limits.”). The reasonableness of an insurer’s decision not to
settle cannot be judged in hindsight; rather, the court must consider only the
information that was available to the insurer when it rejected the settlement offer. Nat’l
Union, 2018 WL 5095267, at *2 (citing Hodges v. Std. Accident Ins. Co., 18 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 24 (Ct. App. 1961)). Concentrating solely on the information available to the
insurance company at the time it declined to settle is essential because “no one can
predict what any particular jury will do.” Hodges, 18 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
8
In the liability insurance context, the insurance company typically negotiates
(frequently through defense counsel) and agrees to pay any settlement on the insured’s
behalf consistent with its policy terms. See ISO CGL Policy, supra note 6, at 1 (“We
may, at our discretion, investigate any ‘occurrence’ and settle any claim or ‘suit’ that
may result.”).
9
Pack v. Middlebury Cmty. Schs., 990 F.3d 1013, 1017 (7th Cir. 2021)
(applying Indiana law); Ryan Contracting Co. v. O’Neill & Murphy, LLP, 883
N.W.2d 236, 249 (Minn. 2016); Lund v. Swanson, 956 N.W.2d 354, 358 (N.D. 2021);
State ex rel. Lee v. Village of Plain City, 102 N.E.3d 10, 14 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017).
10
Platinum Supplemental Ins., Inc. v. Guarantee Tr. Life Ins. Co., 989 F.3d 556,
563 (7th Cir. 2021) (applying Illinois law); Prop. Cal. SCJLW One Corp. v. Leamy,
236 Cal. Rptr. 3d 500, 506 (Ct. App. 2018); Avery v. Comm’r, N.H. Dep’t of Corrs.,
248 A.3d 1179, 1189 (N.H. 2020).
11
Myers v. Myers, 955 N.W.2d 223, 229 (Iowa Ct. App. 2020); Carruthers v.
Serenity Mem’l Funeral & Cremation Serv., LLC, 576 S.W.3d 301, 306 (Mo. Ct. App.
2019).
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either offer or acceptance.12 For instance, to be valid, a settlement offer
must be capable of acceptance.13 Thus, a settlement offer that requires the
insurer to produce copies of the declarations pages of every insurance
policy that covers the insured for the subject accident – including policies
issued by other insurance companies – is not valid because the insurer has
no ability, authority, or right to produce other insurance companies’
records.14 Alternatively, consider a case that involves a progressive
occurrence, such as the plaintiff’s exposure to asbestos or toxic chemicals
over a period of years, such that multiple insurers may be obligated to
indemnify the insured. An offer by the plaintiff to one of them to settle
for the limits of all applicable insurance policies is not capable of
acceptance by the single insurer to which the offer is made because that
insurer does not have the authority to bind the other insurers; it can only
offer its own policy limits in settlement.15
When it comes to accepting a settlement offer, the “mirror image”
rule applies in this context as it does in other contract formation
scenarios.16 The mirror image generally holds that “[a]n acceptance of a
settlement offer must be a ‘mirror image’ of the offer in all material
respects. Otherwise, it will be considered a counteroffer that rejects the
original offer.”17 So, for example, an insurer that sends a claimant a
settlement check accompanied by a proposed release that is materially
broader than the release the claimant said she would agree to may in some
jurisdictions convert the attempted acceptance of the claimant’s settlement
12

See, e.g., Camacho v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 13 F. Supp. 3d 1343, 1360
(N.D. Ga. 2014) (holding that the plaintiffs’ “policy-limits demand when read in its
entirety was a legally acceptable offer, susceptible to Nationwide’s prompt response,
and thus that settlement was possible”); Davis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Ins., 470 S.W.3d
97, 105 (Tex. App. 2015) (concluding that an accident victim’s demand to settle for
policy limits was a counteroffer to the insurer’s settlement offer and thus terminated
the victim’s power to subsequently accept the insurer’s offer).
13
See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Wrights Mill Holdings, LLC, 127 F. Supp. 3d
156, 171 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (“[T]he term ‘offer’ necessarily implies something that is
capable of being accepted.”); Wallace v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. C 97-3806 MJJ, 1999
WL 51822, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1999) (“[T]he insurer must be given a reasonable
opportunity to settle within the policy limits and any offer must be capable of
acceptance on the part of the insurer.”).
14
Whitney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 258 P.3d 113, 118–19 (Alaska
2011).
15
This position assumes that the other insurers have not authorized the insurer
to which the settlement offer was made to settle on their behalf.
16
Grant v. Sears, 379 S.W.3d 905, 915 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Reppy v.
Winters, 351 S.W.3d 717, 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011)).
17
Breger v. Robshaw Custom Homes, Inc., 264 So. 3d 1147, 1150 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2019).
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offer into a counteroffer.18 If the claimant declines the counteroffer, there
is no settlement.19 This turn of events can be enormously consequential if
the insured’s potential liability exceeds its policy limits and litigation
ensues.20 If there is a judgment in excess of the insurance policy limits,
the insurer may be liable for the full amount of the judgment and possibly
other damages under the law of bad faith for failing to settle the case within
policy limits.21 In fact, adherence to the mirror image rule in cases of
potential excess liability can encourage bad faith litigation:
It has become clear that, to a plaintiff whose injuries greatly exceed
the available coverage, a policy-limits settlement can be less valuable
than a rejected offer and consequent bad-faith claim—however
dubious the claim. In the context of proceedings to enforce purported
settlements, plaintiffs sometimes structure offers not to reach
settlements, but rather to elicit rejections.22

The importance of achieving enforceable settlement agreements is
difficult to overstate. The law and public policy strongly favor the
settlement of disputes, and courts would be overwhelmed if most cases
went to trial.23 This Article examines contractual aspects of settlement in
the liability insurance context, concentrating on the elements of offer and
acceptance. Part II discusses the requirements of a valid settlement offer.
In short, settlement offerors are masters of their offers and offers must be
definite and include material terms that are reasonably certain. Part III
analyzes the second step in the contracting process—acceptance. Here the
18
See, e.g., Pena v. Fox, 198 So. 3d 61, 64 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (concluding
that there was no meeting of the minds and thus no settlement agreement on these
facts).
19
Id.
20
See Freeman v. Leader Nat’l Ins. Co., 58 S.W.3d 590, 598 (Mo. Ct. App.
2001).
21
See id. at 598 (“An insurer’s right to control settlement and litigation . . .
creates a fiduciary relationship between insurer and insured. . . . Thus, an insurer owes
a duty to exercise good faith in evaluating and negotiating third-party claims against
its insured, and the insurer may be held liable in tort for a third-party judgment in
excess of policy limits if it fails to perform its fiduciary obligation in good faith.”).
22
Wright v. Nelson, 856 S.E.2d 421, 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021) (McFadden, C.J.,
concurring).
23
See J.W. v. Indiana, 113 N.E.3d 1202, 1206 (Ind. 2019) (“Indiana’s judicial
policy strongly favors agreements to settle litigation. . . . Our judicial system counts
on such settlements to occur in the lion’s share of . . . cases. Otherwise, with more
than a million cases filed in our trial courts each year, the system would grind to a
halt.”); Appleyard v. Tigges, 114 N.Y.S.3d 627, 628 (App. Div. 2019) (asserting that
“the courts could not function if every dispute resulted in a trial”).
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principal impediment to settlement is the mirror image rule, although that
rule presents less of an obstacle if its application is confined to the material
terms of the offer. Finally, Part IV briefly addresses insurers’ ability to
reject settlement offers that are intended to facilitate later bad faith
litigation without incurring extracontractual liability as a result.

II. THE SETTLEMENT OFFER
For parties to reach a settlement agreement there must first be a
definite offer to settle.24 Under established contract law, “[a]n offer cannot
be vague.”25 If an offer is vague, there is no intent on the offeror’s part to
be bound.26 In addition, an offer must also be certain with respect to its
material conditions and terms.27 In short, even if parties intend to contract,
there will be no enforceable agreement if the material terms of the
contemplated agreement are not reasonably certain.28 A valid offer does
not, however, require the offeror to use “any specific terms of art.”29

A. Illustrative Cases
American Family Mutual Insurance Co. v. Browning illustrates how
a settlement offer can come up short. In Browning, David Browning was
injured when he wrecked his car after he swerved to avoid hitting Kyle
Himmelberg’s car.30
Himmelberg was insured under an American Family personal auto
policy with per person bodily injury liability limits of $50,000.31 The
policy also included an “additional payments” provision with a “first aid
clause” that provided American Family would “‘pay in addition to [its]
limit of liability . . . expenses incurred by an insured person for first aid to

24
Sumerel v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 232 P.3d 128, 133 (Colo. App.
2009); Smith v. King, 953 N.W.2d 258, 274 (Neb. Ct. App. 2020).
25
Jones v. Capella Univ., No. 19-2521, 2020 WL 6875419, at *6 (D. Minn. Nov.
23, 2020).
26
Magnusson Agency v. Pub. Entity Nat’l Co.-Midwest, 560 N.W.2d 20, 26
(Iowa 1997).
27
Id. Uncertainty as to non-essential terms, however, will not prevent a court
from enforcing a settlement agreement. BP Prods. N. Am., Inc. v. Oakridge at
Winegard, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (applying Florida law).
28
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 47–48 (7th ed. 2014).
29
Shockley v. PrimeLending, 929 F.3d 1012, 1017 (8th Cir. 2019) (applying
Missouri law)
30
621 S.W.3d 619, 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 2021).
31
Id.
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others at the time of an auto accident involving your insured car.’”32
Browning was treated by medical professionals at the accident scene, in
the ambulance en route to the hospital, and in the hospital emergency
room, but Himmelberg never rendered first aid to him.33
In a letter to American Family offering to settle his claims against
Himmelberg, Browning “agreed ‘to unconditionally release Kyle
Himmelberg from all present and future liability under RSMo. § 537.058
. . . in exchange for all applicable policy limits and payments.’”34
Browning further wrote that he was making his settlement offer “‘under
RSMo. § 537.058 and intend[ed] th[e] offer to comply with that
section.’”35 The Missouri statute to which Browning referred provided in
pertinent part:
A time-limited demand to settle any claim for personal injury, bodily
injury, or wrongful death shall be in writing, shall reference this
section, shall be sent certified mail return-receipt requested to the tortfeasor’s liability insurer, and shall contain the following material
terms:
(1) The time period within which the offer shall remain open for
acceptance by the tort-feasor’s liability insurer, which shall not be less
than ninety days from the date such demand is received by the liability
insurer;
(2) The amount of monetary payment requested or a request for the
applicable policy limits;
(3) The date and location of the loss;
(4) The claim number, if known;
(5) A description of all known injuries sustained by the claimant;
(6) The party or parties to be released if such time-limited demand is
accepted;
(7) A description of the claims to be released if such time-limited
demand is accepted; and

32

Id. at 297.
Browning, 621 S.W.3d at 621.
34
Id. (quoting Browning’s letter).
35
Id. (quoting Browning’s letter).
33
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(8) An offer of unconditional release for the liability insurer’s insureds
from all present and future liability for that occurrence under section
537.060.36

Browning left his offer open for ninety-one days from the date
American Family received his letter.37
American Family timely responded by letter and stated “that it was
‘meeting the demand of all applicable policy limits which [are] $50,000
for this claim.’”38 Browning’s lawyer replied that American Family’s
response was a counteroffer rather than an acceptance of Browning’s
settlement offer because American Family did not include amounts
allegedly due under the first aid clause in Himmelberg’s policy.39
The parties thereafter agreed that American Family would file a
declaratory judgment action to determine whether Browning was owed
more than the $50,000 per person bodily injury limit of Himmelberg’s
policy.40 In its declaratory judgment petition, American Family alleged
that (1) Browning’s letter did not mention first aid expenses allegedly
incurred by Himmelberg, such that it had no duty to include first aid
coverage in its letter attempting to accept Browning’s settlement offer; and
(2) Himmelberg did not incur any first aid expenses, such that it could
have no duty to pay them in response to Browning’s offer.41 The trial court
awarded American Family summary judgment on the basis that
Himmelberg incurred no first aid expenses.42 Browning appealed.43
The Missouri Court of Appeals sidestepped the parties’ arguments
over the applicability of American Family’s first aid clause because
Browning “did not, in fact, request payment of his first aid expenses in his
demand letter.”44 Browning’s letter stated that he would absolve
Himmelberg of all liability “‘in exchange for all applicable policy limits
and payments.’”45 Browning argued that his “inclusion of ‘and payments’
in his settlement offer constituted a demand that, in addition to paying the

36

MO. REV. STAT. § 537.058.2(2) (2020).
Browning, 621 S.W.3d at 623.
38
Id. at 621.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. (referring to Browning’s settlement offer as a “demand”).
42
Id. at 621–22.
43
Id. at 622.
44
Id.
45
Id. at 623 (quoting Browning’s letter).
37
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policy limits, American Family pay his first aid expenses,” but the
Browning court disagreed.46
First, Browning did not state in his letter that the “payments” he now
claimed described first aid expenses incurred by Himmelberg were any
such thing.47 Indeed, he never mentioned “first aid” in his letter, nor did
he inform American Family that he had received first aid and had
accumulated related expenses.48 For that matter, nothing in his letter to
American Family even hinted that he was looking to recover first aid
expenses.49
Second, the statute under which Browning offered to settle required
him to state in his letter “‘[t]he amount of monetary payment requested or
a request for the applicable policy limits.’”50 Yet, the only identifiable
monetary payment Browning requested was the $50,000 per person bodily
injury limit listed on the declarations page of the American Family
policy.51 If Browning was seeking a sum other than the policy limits, the
statute made clear that he needed to specify that amount.52
At bottom, when Browning chose to make a time-limited settlement
demand under the Missouri statute, he accepted responsibility for
complying with the statute’s provisions. 53 Those provisions included the
requirement that he specify the amount of monetary payment requested in
settlement or request the applicable insurance policy limits. 54 His
argument that his request for “payments” satisfied this requirement and
accordingly obligated American Family “to choose whether to accept his
demand to pay an unknown amount for unmentioned first aid expenses”
was unsupportable.55 The Browning court therefore affirmed the trial

46

Id.
Id.
48
Id. Again, it would not have mattered even if Browning had received first aid
because the first aid clause in American Family’s policy provided Himmelberg with
first-party coverage; the clause was not intended to benefit Browning and Browning
had no standing to seek payment under the clause. Richmond, supra note 32, at 294.
49
Browning, 621 S.W.3d at 623. At the risk of sounding like a broken record, it
would not have mattered even had Browning sought coverage under the first aid clause
in American Family’s policy because he had no standing to assert the clause and no
right to recovery thereunder. Richmond, supra note 32, at 294.
50
Browning, 621 S.W.3d at 623 (quoting MO. REV. STAT. § 537.058.2(2)
(2020)).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 622.
53
Id. at 623.
54
Id. at 623–24.
55
Id. at 624.
47
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court’s declaratory judgment that American Family owed nothing under
its first aid clause.56
First Acceptance Insurance Company of Georgia, Inc. v. Hughes is
another recent case in which a settlement offer was found wanting.57 In
that case, Ronald Jackson caused a multi-vehicle accident in which he was
killed.58 Jackson was insured by First Acceptance under an auto policy
with liability limits of $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident.59 At
least five people were hurt in the accident, including Julie An and her
daughter, Jina Hong.60
First Acceptance engaged counsel to try and achieve a global
settlement of the five known accident victims’ injury claims.61 Toward
that goal, First Acceptance’s lawyer proposed that the parties schedule a
joint settlement conference or mediation.62 In response, An and Hong’s
lawyer faxed two letters (described by the court as the June 2 Letters) to
First Acceptance’s lawyer.63 In the first letter, An and Hong’s lawyer
stated that his clients would like to resolve their claims within First
Acceptance’s policy limits and expressed their interest in attending a joint
settlement conference.64 Then, after referring to An and Hong’s UM
policy limits, the lawyer wrote:
Of course, the exact amount of UM benefits available to my clients
depends upon the amount paid to them from the available liability
coverage. Once that is determined, a release of your insured from all
personal liability except to the extent other insurance coverage is
available will be necessary in order to preserve my clients’ rights to
recover under the UM coverage and any other insurance policies. In
fact, if you would rather settle within your insured’s policy limits now,

56

Id.
826 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Ga. 2019). First Acceptance attracted notable attention in
the insurance law community when the decision came down. See, e.g., Jeff Sistrunk,
Ga. High Court Ruling Curbs “Gotcha” Bad Faith Cases, LAW360 (Mar. 12, 2019,
9:47 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/1137760 [https://perma.cc/HRJ3ABH8] (reporting lawyers’ and observers’ reactions to the opinion); Jeff Sistrunk,
Insurer Not Liable for $5.3M Crash Award, Ga. Justices Say, LAW360 (Mar. 11, 2019,
8:28 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/1137760 [https://perma.cc/9U8M2SYJ] (describing the case as “closely watched”).
58
First Acceptance, 826 S.E.2d at 73.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 74.
64
Id. at 76.
57
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you can do that by providing that release document with all the
insurance information as requested . . . along with your insured’s
available bodily injury liability insurance proceeds.65

In the second letter, the lawyer asked First Acceptance to “‘provide,
within thirty days of the date of this letter,’ certain insurance
information.”66 The letter later stated: “‘Any settlement will be
conditioned upon [the attorney’s] receipt of all the requested insurance
information.’”67
First Acceptance’s lawyer read the June 2 Letters but did not interpret
them as making any sort of time-limited settlement demand.68
Unfortunately, the June 2 Letters got misplaced and First Acceptance’s
lawyer did not respond to An and Hong’s lawyer.69 Forty days later, An
and Hong sued Jackson’s estate.70 Soon thereafter, An and Hong’s lawyer
faxed a letter to First Acceptance’s lawyer in which he wrote that he had
heard nothing in response to the June 2 Letters and that his clients’
settlement offer was revoked.71 First Acceptance’s lawyer attempted to
coax the lawyer and his clients into attending a global settlement
conference to no avail.72 First Acceptance then tried to settle An and
Hong’s claims for the combined policy limit of $50,000 but failed.73 An
and Hong instead took their case to trial and won a $5.3 million judgment
against Jackson’s estate.74 Robert Hughes, the administrator of Jackson’s
estate, then sued First Acceptance for negligence and bad faith in failing
to settle Hong’s claim within Jackson’s policy limits.75
First Acceptance prevailed at summary judgment in the trial court,
but the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed.76 First Acceptance then
appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court, which was initially interested in
“whether an insurer’s duty to settle arises when it knows or reasonably
should know settlement with an injured party within the insured’s policy
limits is possible or only when the injured party presents a valid offer to

65

Id.
Id. (quoting the letter) (alteration in original).
67
Id. (quoting the letter) (alteration in original).
68
Id. at 74.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
66
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settle within the insured’s policy limits.”77 The court quickly clarified that
“an insurer’s duty to settle arises when the injured party presents a valid
offer to settle within the insured’s policy limits.”78 The question thus
became whether An and Hong made a valid settlement offer that First
Acceptance wrongfully failed to timely accept.79 This was an issue of law
for the court applying traditional rules of contract construction.80
The First Acceptance court carefully studied the June 2 Letters.81 The
court found the letters to be mostly clear:
An and Hong, through their attorney, express[ed] a willingness to
participate in the proposed settlement conference with other claimants.
Alternatively, they express[ed] their willingness to settle their claims
upon receipt of three items: (1) a release of the insured from all
personal liability except to the extent other insurance coverage is
available, (2) the requested insurance information, and (3) the
insured’s available bodily injury liability insurance proceeds. The
offer to settle [was] not, at least expressly, subject to a time limit for
acceptance. Nor [did] An and Hong state an express time limit on
their willingness to attend the settlement conference.82

Even so, Hughes argued that the June 2 Letters established a thirtyday deadline to settle An and Hong’s injury claims that First Acceptance
failed to meet.83 Naturally, First Acceptance disputed Hughes’s
characterization of the June 2 Letters as constituting a time-restricted
settlement offer.84 According to First Acceptance, the June 2 Letters were
at best vague:
The offer at issue [was] expressly subject to First Acceptance’s
provision of “all the insurance information as requested in the
attached.” The phrase “as requested” could simply refer to the
insurance information. Under that interpretation of the offer, if First
Acceptance submitted all the insurance information requested in the
second letter, it would have satisfied the condition. On the other hand,
“as requested” could mean in the manner requested in the second letter,

77

Id. at 73.
Id. at 75 (footnoted omitted).
79
Id. (footnote omitted).
80
Id.
81
See id. at 76 (describing the content of the June 2 Letters).
82
Id. (emphasis added).
83
Id.
84
Id.
78
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which include[d] a request that the insurance information be submitted
within 30 days of the date of that letter.85

As the First Acceptance court saw things, “the most reasonable
construction of the June 2 Letters, when considered as a whole,” was that
they did not impose a thirty-day deadline for accepting An and Hong’s
settlement offer.86 An and Hong’s offer to settle for Jackson’s policy
limits was proposed as an alternative to their participation in the global
settlement conference that First Acceptance hoped to arrange.87 There was
no date set for the settlement conference, however, nor did the June 2
Letters impose a time limit on An and Hong’s willingness to attend a
settlement conference or fix a deadline to settle beforehand.88 The request
in the second letter that First Acceptance provide the desired insurance
information within thirty days was “not logically consistent with a
requirement that acceptance of the settlement offer must occur within 30
days.”89 Of course, an agreement that is capable of being construed more
than one way will be construed against the drafter—here, against An and
Hong.90
The First Acceptance court concluded that An and Hong’s settlement
offer in the June 2 Letters did not impose a thirty-day deadline for
acceptance.91 An offer that is silent as to the time allowed for acceptance
remains open for a reasonable time.92 Consequently, First Acceptance was
entitled to summary judgment on Hughes’s claims.93 Because An and
Hong’s settlement offer was not time-limited, First Acceptance could not
know that its failure to accept the offer by any certain time would be
considered a rejection of the offer.94 Furthermore, given that the June 2
Letters reflected An and Hong’s clear desire to participate in a global
settlement conference, First Acceptance could not have reasonably known
that it needed to respond to the June 2 Letters within thirty days to avoid

85

Id.
Id.
87
Id. at 76–77.
88
Id. at 77.
89
Id.
90
Id. (quoting Hertz Equip. Rental Corp. v. Evans, 397 S.E.2d 692, 694 (Ga.
1990)).
91
Id.
92
Id. (quoting Simpson & Harper v. Sanders & Jenkins, 60 S.E. 541, 543 (Ga.
1908)).
93
Id.
94
Id.
86
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exposing Jackson’s estate to an excess judgment.95 All that being so, the
First Acceptance court reversed the judgment of the Georgia Court of
Appeals.96

B. Lessons from Browning and First Acceptance
Browning and First Acceptance reflect the contract law aphorism that
the offeror is the master of his or her offer.97 If Browning intended his
settlement offer to include the money allegedly due him under American
Family’s first aid clause, he should have expressly (1) identified the first
aid clause in his letter and (2) specified the sum to be paid for first aid. He
did neither.98 If An and Hong meant for their settlement offer to expire
after thirty days, their lawyer should have clearly stated that term in the
June 2 Letters. The lawyer did not do so.99 If settlement on the alleged
terms was the claimants’ goal in either case, the indefiniteness of their
offers was a fatal shortcoming.
Far more likely, however, the alleged terms of the settlement offers
in these cases were merely elements of litigation strategies. Browning,
An, and Hong never wanted to settle for the insurance policy limits.
Rather, Browning’s lawyer surely was hoping that American Family’s
response to his settlement offer would omit any mention of the first aid
clause, so he could say that American Family had counteroffered instead
of agreeing to settle within policy limits and thereby position American
Family for a bad faith claim. An and Hong’s lawyer used First
Acceptance’s alleged failure to accept their settlement offer within thirty
days as an excuse to sue Jackson’s estate in order to try and collect the
anticipated excess judgment from First Acceptance on a bad faith
theory.100 Indeed, both Browning and First Acceptance exemplify one
judge’s observation that where a plaintiff’s damages “greatly exceed the
available [insurance] coverage, a policy-limits settlement can be less

95

Id.
Id. at 78.
97
Olsen v. Johnston, 301 P.3d 791, 794 (Mont. 2013); Fast Ball Sports, LLC v.
Metro. Ent. & Convention Auth., 835 N.W.2d 782, 790 (Neb. Ct. App. 2013); Brown
v. Between Dandelions, Inc., 849 S.E.2d 67, 70 (N.C. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting
MacEachern v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 254 S.E.2d 263, 265 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979));
Stavron v. SureTec Ins. Co., No. 02-19-00125-CV, 2019 WL 6768125, at *4 (Tex.
App. Dec. 12, 2019).
98
Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Browning, 621 S.W.3d 619, 621–24 (Mo. Ct. App.
2021).
99
First Acceptance, 826 S.E.2d at 76.
100
Id. at 74.
96
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valuable than a rejected offer and consequent bad-faith claim—however
dubious the claim.”101 As almost certainly was true in Browning and First
Acceptance, “plaintiffs sometimes structure offers not to reach
settlements, but rather to elicit rejections.”102 In other words, Browning,
An, and Hong, as masters of their offers, were simply aiming for rejection
rather than acceptance in structuring their settlement offers as they did.

III. ACCEPTANCE OF THE SETTLEMENT OFFER
A firm offer alone is not sufficient to achieve a settlement because,
after all, a settlement agreement is a bilateral contract.103 To create a
bilateral contract, the offeree must communicate its acceptance of the offer
to the offeror.104 Generally, “for an offer and an acceptance to constitute
a contract, the acceptance must meet and correspond with the offer in
every respect.”105 This is the “mirror image” rule,106 also known less
commonly as the “ribbon matching” rule.107 Under a strict application of
the mirror image rule, “[a]n acceptance which varies the terms of the offer
is considered a rejection and operates as a counteroffer,” which the
original offeror may then accept or reject.108 A mere inquiry as to whether

101

Wright v. Nelson, 856 S.E.2d 421, 425 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021) (McFadden, C.J.,
concurring).
102
Id. (McFadden, C.J., concurring).
103
Kannaday v. Ball, 234 P.3d 826, 832 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010); Rawald v.
Dormitory Auth. of N.Y., 2021 WL 627958, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 17, 2021), rev’d
on other grounds, 156 N.Y.S.3d 201, 202 (App. Div. 2021).
104
See, e.g., Powerhouse Custom Homes, Inc. v. 84 Lumber Co., L.P., 705
S.E.2d 704, 706 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that because the defendant did not
communicate its acceptance of the plaintiffs’ proposal that amounted to a settlement
offer, it followed that no settlement agreement was reached).
105
Downs v. Radentz, 132 N.E.3d 58, 67 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).
106
Id.
107
PERILLO, supra note 28, at 90.
108
Downs, 132 N.E.3d at 67; see also Nomanbhoy Fam. Ltd. P’ship v.
McDonald’s Corp., 579 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1092 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (“Under Illinois law,
a response to an offer to enter into a contractual relationship that does not comply
strictly with it—that is, that is not the ‘mirror image’ of the offer—is not an
acceptance, but a counteroffer. It matters not how minor the deviation.”); Kemper v.
Brown, 754 S.E.2d 141, 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 2014) (“To establish a contract, the offer
must be accepted unequivocally and without variance of any sort. . . . A purported
acceptance of an offer that varies even one term of the original offer is a
counteroffer.”) (citation omitted).
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the offeror will modify the terms of the offer, however, does not constitute
a rejection of the offer or create a counteroffer.109
Insurers’ acceptance or attempted acceptance of plaintiffs’ settlement
offers are frequent sources of dispute.110 The mirror image rule is at the
core of many of these cases.111 The overarching issue often is whether a
failed settlement based on the insurer’s failure to comply with the mirror
image rule will support subsequent bad faith litigation against the insurer
for failing to settle within its policy limits. 112

A. Representative Acceptance Cases
Pena v. Fox “invoke[d] a hornbook tenet of contract law: the
symmetry needed between an offer and an acceptance to establish an

109
Rios v. State, 974 A.2d 366, 375–76 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2009); Muilenberg,
Inc. v. Cherokee Rose Design & Build, L.L.C., 250 S.W.3d 848, 852 (Mo. Ct. App.
2008).
110
See, e.g., Lee v. Chmielewski, 290 So. 3d 531, 535–36 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2019) (concluding that the insurer accepted the settlement offer by faxing a letter after
normal business hours and sending a representative with a check to the plaintiff’s
lawyer’s offices on the evening of the day set as the deadline for acceptance; although
the letter was faxed and the representative arrived at the lawyer’s office after normal
business hours, the acceptance was still effective because the plaintiff’s offer did not
state a specific time that it would expire that day).
111
See, e.g., McReynolds v. Krebs, 725 S.E.2d 584, 588 (Ga. 2012) (explaining
that the insurance company’s added condition regarding the resolution of liens—as
compared to a mere request for confirmation that no liens existed—resulted in a
counteroffer rather than an acceptance of the plaintiff’s offer, such that no settlement
agreement was formed); Hansen v. Doan, 740 S.E.2d 338, 341–43 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)
(stating that the insurer’s request for confirmation of the plaintiff’s medical bills and
lost wages was not a counteroffer under a Georgia statute, explaining that sending a
form release that the plaintiff’s lawyer could modify as he saw fit—including deleting
any unacceptable language—was not a counteroffer even though it contained language
that the plaintiff’s lawyer had said would be unacceptable, and concluding that the
insurer accepted the plaintiff’s settlement offer unequivocally and without variation);
Reppy v. Winters, 351 S.W.3d 717, 721–22 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (“Because Winters’s
. . . letter, by its plain language, added to Reppy’s original offer a term requiring
Reppy’s counsel to indemnify Winters, his insurer, and his attorney for any type of
lien, it was not a mirror image of the original offer and was not an unequivocal
acceptance.”).
112
See, e.g., Eres v. Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 998 F.3d 1273, 1279–81 (11th
Cir. 2021) (rejecting a bad faith claim rooted in the insurer’s alleged failure to satisfy
the mirror image rule); Grayson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 650 F. App’x 320, 322–23 (9th
Cir. 2016) (explaining why Allstate’s inclusion of an overly broad release with its
letter accepting the plaintiff’s settlement offer may have constituted a counteroffer but
was not an act of bad faith).
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enforceable agreement.”113 The plaintiff there, Diana Pena, was injured in
an auto accident with Matthew Fox.114 Rather than immediately suing
Fox, Pena’s lawyer presented a policy limits settlement offer to Fox’s
insurer, USAA Casualty Insurance Co. (USAA).115 The settlement offer
provided that Pena would release Fox from all claims related to the
accident and anticipated that USAA would furnish a release for Pena to
execute, but it set certain conditions on the release’s terms.116 Specifically,
the offer stated that Pena would not accept or sign a release that included
hold harmless language or an indemnity agreement, would not release her
claims against anyone other than Fox, and would not release anyone’s
claim other than her own.117 The offer firmly expressed Pena’s position
that USAA’s delivery of a release that included hold harmless language or
an indemnity agreement, released anyone other than Fox, or released any
claim other than Pena’s claim, would “act as a rejection” of the settlement
offer.118
In response, USAA sent a check for its policy limits and a proposed
release to Pena’s lawyer.119 USAA’s proposed release contained the
following language:
I/We further state that while I/we hereby release all claims against
Releasee(s), its agents, and employees, the payment hereunder does
not satisfy all of my/our damages resulting from the accident. . . . I/We
further reserve my/our right to pursue and recover all unpaid damages
from any person, firm, or organization who may be responsible for
payment of such damages, including first party health and automobile
insurance coverage, but such reservation does not include the
Releasee(s), its agents, and employees. . . .120

Pena considered the “Releasee(s), its agents, and employees”
language to be an effort to expand the release to include USAA in addition
to Fox and thus a rejection of her settlement offer.121 She then sued Fox,

113

198 So. 3d 61, 62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. (emphasis added).
121
Id.
114
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who moved to enforce the settlement.122 The trial court granted Fox’s
motion and dismissed Pena’s complaint.123 Pena promptly appealed.124
The Pena court began its analysis of the parties’ positions by noting
that settlement agreements are governed by contract law.125 For there to
be a contract under Florida law, “the acceptance must be a ‘mirror image’
of the offer in all material respects, or else it will be considered a
counteroffer that rejects the original offer.”126 A party’s attempt to accept
an offer can become a counteroffer through the addition of new or different
terms or by not meeting the original offer’s terms.127 USAA’s proposed
release touched both bases: it added parties to be released beyond Fox —
in particular, his agents and employees — and it materially departed from
the limitations plainly set forth in Pena’s offer.128
While “the incongruity in terms may have been nothing more than
boilerplate migrating across computer-generated files,” the fact remained
that USAA’s attempted acceptance on Fox’s behalf did not mirror Pena’s
offer.129 Nor did it matter that USAA was not trying to pull a fast one in
proposing the offending release language:130 “The words are what matter
because they will control who will, or will not, be released. . . . Mr. Fox’s
proposed acceptance would release additional parties, Mr. Fox’s agents
and employees, which Ms. Pena’s offer would not. His acceptance did not
mirror her offer.”131
It was apparent after comparing Pena’s settlement offer with Fox’s
acceptance (through USAA) that the parties’ minds never met and,
consequently, there was no settlement agreement to enforce.132 The Pena
court therefore reversed the trial court’s dismissal of Pena’s complaint and
remanded the case for further proceedings.133

122

Id.
Id.
124
Id. at 63.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. (quoting Grant v. Lyons, 17 So. 3d 708, 711 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)).
128
Id. at 63–64.
129
Id.
130
See id. at 64 (“While we share the circuit court’s view that the inclusion of
Mr. Fox’s agents and employees within the release was not the product of nefarious
motives, USAA’s intention when it drafted this document, whatever it might have
been, was irrelevant to the issue at hand.”).
131
Id. (citations omitted).
132
Id.
133
Id.
123

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

19

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 1 [], Art. 8

214

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

More recently, a Georgia appellate court enforced the mirror image
rule in White v. Cheek,134 which involved a rigid and exacting settlement
offer by the plaintiff. The case arose out of a car wreck.135 Walter Cheek
was a passenger in a car driven by Stephan White; Cheek was injured in
the accident and sued White.136 White was insured by GEICO.137 After
Cheek sued White, Cheek’s lawyer sent GEICO a letter that contained a
settlement offer governed by a Georgia statute, § 9-11-67.1.138 The offer
stated:
1. The time period within which the material terms pursuant to OCGA
§ 9-11-67.1 (a) must be accepted is thirty-five (35) days from your
receipt of this offer;
2. The amount of monetary payment is GEICO’s liability policy limit
of $25,000. . . .;
3. The party that Mr. Cheek will release is Stephan D. White;
4. The type of release that Mr. Cheek will provide to Mr. White is a
General Release that releases “all personal and bodily injury claims of
Mr. Cheek,” . . . ;
5. The claims to be released by Mr. Cheek pursuant to a General
Release are “all personal and bodily injury claims of Mr. Cheek,” . . .
;
Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (b), acceptance of the material terms
made pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) is to be made by providing
written acceptance of the material terms outlined immediately above
pursuant OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) in their entirety.
Providing written acceptance of the material terms outlined
immediately above pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) in their entirety
is necessary to form a binding settlement contract, but it is not
sufficient to form a binding settlement contract. In addition to the
above . . . the following ACTS are material to acceptance and must be
completed to form a binding settlement contract, and completion of
each and every one of the following ACTS without a variance of any
sort is required as a material term of this written offer of compromise

134

859 S.E.2d 104, 108–09 (Ga. Ct. App. 2021).
Id. at 106.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
135
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in addition to the material terms stated above pursuant to OCGA § 911-67.1 (a):
1. Pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (g), payment is required within
fifteen (15) days after the written acceptance of this offer of
compromise. . . .
2. Your insured must provide a sworn and notarized statement that
there is no other insurance coverage available to him that could pertain
to this loss. . . .
3. All communications to this firm initiated by or on behalf of your
insurance company or your insured relating to this offer of
compromise must be made in writing. If a communication to this firm
relating to this offer of compromise is initiated by or on behalf of your
insurance company or your insured in any form other than writing, that
will be a rejection of this offer of compromise. . . . Any offer to resolve
this case by Mr. Cheek will be made in writing. Any acceptance of this
offer must be made through performance of the acts required in this
offer of compromise in addition to written acceptance of the material
terms of this offer made pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-67.1 (a) in order
for this firm and Mr. Cheek to agree that a binding agreement has been
formed. Specifically, this offer of compromise cannot be accepted by
a mere statement of unconditional acceptance of this offer; instead
acceptance of this offer requires full performance of all ACTS required
herein without variance of any sort in addition to written acceptance
of the material terms of this offer made pursuant OCGA § 9-11-67.1
(a). If any condition or requirement is not met by the specified
deadline or if any additional terms, conditions, or representatives are
requested of Mr. Cheek or included in the release by GEICO, then
there has been no acceptance and no agreement, and this offer will be
immediately and automatically withdrawn.
4. Since GEICO will require Mr. Cheek to sign a release of its insured,
that release must fully comply with each and every term and condition
of this offer. . . .139

In the letter that contained the settlement offer, Cheek’s lawyer also
stated that if GEICO needed more information to evaluate White’s liability
or Cheek’s damages, the company should put its request in writing.140
Despite the clear requirement in the settlement offer for all
communications to be in writing, a GEICO adjuster soon left a voicemail

139
140

Id. at 106–07 (alterations in original).
Id. at 107.
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message for Cheek’s lawyer to see whether the lawyer would permit
GEICO to take a recorded statement from Cheek.141 Five days later, either
the same or another GEICO adjuster left a voicemail message for Cheek’s
lawyer in which the adjuster noted the policy limits settlement offer,
requested a recorded statement from Cheek, and asked the lawyer to
explain the basis for his policy limits settlement offer given what GEICO
considered to be White’s dubious liability.142
Cheek’s lawyer responded to the voicemail messages by writing to
GEICO to say that the messages were an obvious rejection of Cheek’s
settlement offer.143 A little while later, a lawyer for GEICO wrote back
to accept Cheek’s settlement offer and enclosed a $25,000 check with the
acceptance letter.144 Some four months later, Cheek’s lawyer declined
GEICO’s offer of compromise in writing and returned the settlement
check.145 White then moved to enforce the parties’ settlement.146
The trial court denied White’s motion.147 The court held that
GEICO’s acceptance of Cheek’s settlement offer was conditioned on
exclusively written communications between GEICO and Cheek’s lawyer,
and that the company’s failure to satisfy that condition meant there was no
settlement agreement.148 White appealed the trial court’s decision to the
Georgia Court of Appeals.149
The White court agreed with the trial court.150 Although the statute
under which Cheek offered to settle provided that GEICO was entitled to
seek clarification around his offer without those inquiries being held to
constitute a rejection or counteroffer, nothing in the statute prevented
Cheek as the master of his offer from insisting that such inquiries be in
writing.151
Cheek’s lawyer established in the settlement offer that all settlementrelated communications had to be in writing.152 He also unambiguously
stated that any requests to clarify the settlement offer had to be in

141

Id.
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id. at 107–08.
145
Id. at 108.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id. at 108–09.
151
Id. at 109.
152
Id.
142

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol87/iss1/8

22

Richmond: Liability Insurance and Contractual Aspects of Settlement

2022]

LIABILITY INSURANCE AND SETTLEMENT

217

writing.153 The GEICO adjusters’ telephone calls resulting in voicemail
messages disregarded these conditions.154 Because the GEICO adjusters
acting as White’s representatives “violated the express terms of the offer,
the parties did not reach a binding settlement agreement.”155
Consequently, the White court affirmed the trial court judgment.156
A concurring Justice noted that as a result of the court’s decision,
Cheek would eventually be able to pursue a bad faith claim against
GEICO.157 The concurrence focused on the reasonableness of Cheek’s
offer, which was embedded in an incredibly long and excruciatingly
detailed letter that was littered with warnings and threats, and which
inflexibly mandated compliance with all of its terms.158 At bottom:
Examination of the offer leads inescapably to the conclusion that an
undertaking to extract and comply with all of its requirements would
require hours of work over and above the effort normally necessary to
finalize a settlement. And having expended that effort, GEICO could
not be certain of success. Indeed, Cheek’s attorneys responded to the
attempted acceptance with a declaration that they deemed it a
rejection—and didn’t come up with their reasons until three months
later.159

According to the concurring Justice, Cheek’s offer letter was
“compelling, if not dispositive, evidence of a lack of intent to settle the
claim and so of bad faith.”160 So, GEICO could reject the offer without
exposing itself to bad faith liability. 161 The court as a whole, however,
was dismissive of a related argument by White that the court’s holding
would set up insurers for bad faith claims.162 As the White court saw
matters, the case had nothing to do with insurance bad faith; rather, it had
everything to do with “the basic contract principle that the offeror is the
master of his offer.”163
In contrast to the decisions in Pena and White, the court in Youngs v.
Conley enforced a settlement agreement despite the insurer’s alleged
153

Id.
Id.
155
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 111 (McFadden, C.J., concurring).
158
Id. (McFadden, C.J., concurring)
159
Id. at 111 (McFadden, C.J., concurring).
160
Id. at 112 (McFadden, C.J., concurring).
161
See id. (“Per force, it is not bad faith to reject an offer made in bad faith.”).
162
Id. at 109 n.2.
163
Id.
154
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failure to adhere to the mirror image rule.164 In doing so, the court
recognized that the terms in dispute were not material to the parties’
settlement agreement, so their inclusion in the related release did not
convert the defendants’ acceptance of the plaintiffs’ offer into a
counteroffer.165
Turning back the clock, Noah Conley was walking to school when
John Youngs ran over him. 166 Youngs was insured by Viking Insurance
Co. of Wisconsin (“Viking”) under a policy with per person liability limits
of $25,000.167 Viking promptly wrote to the Conley family’s lawyer to
offer its policy limits in settlement.168 The Conleys’ lawyer responded
with a letter in which he stated: “Please allow this letter to serve as a
demand for the applicable insurance policy limits of $25,000.00. In
exchange, my client(s) are willing to release and discharge your insured,
John Youngs, for all past and future damages sustained in this motor
vehicle accident.”169 Youngs’s lawyer responded with a letter confirming
the parties’ settlement.170 In that letter, Youngs’s lawyer also indicated
that he would prepare a release and send it to the Conleys’ lawyer for his
review and approval.171
Youngs’s lawyer eventually sent the Conleys’ lawyer a proposed
release, which, in addition to releasing Youngs, released “Sentry Insurance
Group, Sentry Select Insurance Company, Viking Insurance Company of
Wisconsin, and Dairyland Insurance Company[.]”172 When Youngs’s
lawyer did not hear back from the Conleys’ lawyer, he followed up with
an email message in which he stated: “Like in every case, if there is any
provision or language in the draft release that you would like to change or
if you have alternative proposed language that you believe better
memorializes our settlement please let us know.”173 The Conleys’ lawyer
responded with an email message of his own:
As you know, the parties to be released are a material term to any
agreement to settle. Contrary to Plaintiff’s demand, which very clearly
spelled out who Plaintiff would agree to release and discharge, the

164

505 S.W.3d 305, 317 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016).
Id. at 315.
166
Id. at 308.
167
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 309.
172
Id. at 310.
173
Id. at 311.
165
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insurer chose to include itself (and affiliates) as “Released Parties” in
the release document. While I do not know why the insurer varied a
material term, thus presenting a counter offer, it is unacceptable to
Plaintiff, and Mr. Youngs (and his insurer) may consider the counter
offer rejected. We will proceed with litigation.174

This prompted Youngs’s lawyer to try to get the settlement back on
track.175 As he wrote to the Conleys’ lawyer:
First, the release of an insured acts to release the liability insurance
carrier from any obligation related to alleged negligent acts or
omissions of that insured. In other words, a third party plaintiff retains
no claim against the liability insurance company of an insured once
claims against the insured have been released. . . .
Second, as you know, it is routine and customary practice to include
the insurance carrier that is paying settlement funds under a given
policy as a released party in settlement documents that are drafted to
memorialize a settlement agreement.
Since the release of the insured acts to release the insurance carrier
from any claim that a plaintiff may advance, the same result follows
regardless of whether or not the insurance carrier is listed as released
party. Therefore, we are happy to remove the insurance company as a
named released party in the release. This is not a material term and
does not alter our settlement agreement.
The release that we circulated was intended to memorialize our
settlement agreement in accord with your offer . . . and our acceptance.
. . . Please provide us with any revisions you believe are needed to
accurately describe our settlement.176

The Conleys’ lawyer disagreed with Youngs’s explanation and
indicated that the Conleys would soon sue Youngs.177 Youngs’s lawyer
again tried to keep the settlement on track by offering to delete any
language in the release that the Conleys thought was inconsistent with the
parties’ settlement agreement, but got nowhere.178 Youngs then filed a

174

Id.
Id. at 312.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. (“If you do not believe that the release we have proposed adequately
conforms to our settlement agreement, we are willing to take out the draft language
that you . . . do not believe is in conformity with the agreement. We have previously
175
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petition to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement and Noah Conley’s
mother sued Youngs on her son’s behalf.179 The trial court consolidated
the cases, conducted an evidentiary hearing on Youngs’s petition,
enforced the settlement agreement, and dismissed the Conleys’ suit with
prejudice.180 The Conleys responded by appealing.181
On appeal, the Conleys contended that the trial court erred in holding
that the parties had an enforceable agreement because Youngs’s purported
acceptance created a counteroffer by adding the insurance companies as
parties to the release.182 But while Missouri law recognizes the mirror
image rule,183 and the parties to an agreement are a material term, the
inclusion of the insurance companies in the release was not material to the
Conleys’ and Youngs’s agreement.184 Because Missouri law does not
permit direct actions by an accident victim against a tortfeasor’s liability
insurer, the insurer will effectively be released upon the insured’s release
regardless of whether it is included in the agreement.185 Furthermore,
Youngs had deleted the insurers from the release when the Conleys asked
him to do so.186 This accommodation “show[ed] that the inclusion of the
insurance carriers [was] not a material term and [did] not suggest a
counteroffer.”187
At the hearing on Youngs’s motion to enforce the settlement, the
Conleys’ lawyer apparently made a slightly different argument regarding
the release’s construction as a counteroffer, namely that the Conleys never
agreed to indemnify the insurers for any lien claims, yet the insurers had
also been added to the release in that respect.188 But Youngs’s lawyer had
also agreed to delete the lien indemnification language from the release
and the trial court accordingly “held that the inclusion of the insurance
carriers’ names and the language regarding lien identification and

requested that you provide alternative language that you believe is in conformity with
our settlement agreement.”).
179
Id.
180
Id.
181
Id.
182
Id. at 313, 315.
183
See id. at 314 (explaining offer and acceptance under Missouri law).
184
Id. at 315.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
See id. (“In addition, at the evidentiary hearing on Mr. Youngs’s motion to
enforce settlement, the only objections asserted by counsel for the Conleys to the
proposed release were for the inclusion of the insurance carriers as released parties
and the lien identification/indemnification language.”).
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indemnification were not material and, therefore, [did] not constitute a
counteroffer.”189 The Youngs court agreed with the trial court on this
point.190
The Youngs court concluded that an enforceable settlement
agreement existed.191 It therefore affirmed the trial court’s judgment.192

B. Tying the Mirror Image Rule to Material Terms
Liability insurers must recognize the mirror image rule and strive to
comply with it when accepting plaintiffs’ settlement offers.193 The
essential mirror image rule issue, however, is for the courts. That is, which
of the two possible mirror image rule approaches should they adopt? Is it
the version of the rule enforced in some jurisdictions that any response to
an offer that does not perfectly match the offer is not an acceptance but a
counteroffer, no matter how minor the deviation?194 Or, is it the version
of the rule applied by the court in Youngs and courts in other jurisdictions
that mirror image matters only insofar as material terms are concerned?195

189

Id.
See id. at 316–17 (explaining why the indemnification provisions and
adequate lien protection were not conditions of acceptance as highlighted during the
evidentiary hearing).
191
Id. at 317; see also Tillman v. Mejabi, 771 S.E.2d 110, 113 (Ga. Ct. App.
2015) (explaining that the mere presentation of a release unacceptable to the plaintiff
does not constitute a rejection of a settlement offer; although the delivery of a release
in a form acceptable to the plaintiff may be a condition of defendant’s performance, it
is not necessary for the acceptance of a settlement offer).
192
Youngs, 505 S.W.3d at 317.
193
An insurer’s alleged failure to comply with the mirror image rule does not
automatically translate into bad faith liability. See, e.g., Eres v. Progressive Am. Ins.
Co., 998 F.3d 1273, 1278–80 (11th Cir. 2021) (applying Florida law).
194
See, e.g., Nomanbhoy Fam. Ltd. P’ship v. McDonald’s Corp., 579 F. Supp.
2d 1071, 1092 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (applying Illinois law); see also PERILLO, supra note
28, at 90 (“The common law rule is that a purported acceptance that adds qualifications
or conditions operates as a counter-offer . . . even if the qualification or condition
relates to a trivial matter.”) (footnotes omitted).
195
Youngs, 505 S.W.3d at 315; see also Ridenour v. Bank of Am., N.A., 23 F.
Supp. 3d 1201, 1207 (D. Idaho 2014) (“An acceptance doesn’t become a counteroffer
unless it introduces a ‘material variance’ into the terms.”) (quoting Suitts v. First Sec.
Bank of Idaho, N.A., 867 P.2d 260, 266 (Idaho 1993)); Malone v. Saxony Co-op.
Apts., Inc., 763 A.2d 725, 728 (D.C. 2000) (“[A] statement purporting to accept an
offer which contains a new material term operates as a counteroffer and must be
accepted by the original offeror in order to form a binding contract.”) (emphasis
added); Breger v. Robshaw Custom Homes, Inc., 264 So. 3d 1147, 1150 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2019) (“An acceptance of a settlement offer must be a ‘mirror image’ of the
190
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The trend is “to uphold acceptances that vary from offers in only
immaterial details.”196 Given that courts “encourage and favor settlements
between parties because they reduce demand for judicial resources,”197
“there is a strong public policy favoring settlement of litigation,” 198 and
the law “favors the validity and enforcement of settlement agreements,”199
mandating mirror image acceptance only as to the material terms of a
settlement offer is the superior approach. Indeed, to reason otherwise
serves only to needlessly void many reasonable settlements and to burden
courts with unnecessary litigation.

IV. SETTLEMENT TERMS INSURERS NEED NOT ACCEPT
In addition to offers that are intended to elicit rejections and
acceptances that are dissected for minor violations of the mirror image
rule, plaintiffs sometimes impose settlement terms that are intended to
enable or enhance subsequent bad faith litigation against the insurance
company.200 The essential goal is to propose settlement terms that either
(1) the insurer will reject, thereby positioning the plaintiff to allege that
the insurer unreasonably failed to settle within its policy limits, such that

offer in all material respects. Otherwise, it will be considered a counteroffer that
rejects the original offer.”) (emphasis added); Steele v. Harrison, 552 P.2d 957, 962
(Kan. 1976) (“Any expression of assent that changes the terms of the offer in any
material respect may be operative as a counter-offer, but it is not an acceptance and
constitutes no contract.”) (emphasis added); Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home
Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 514 (Tex. 2014) (“[A]n immaterial variation
between the offer and acceptance will not prevent the formation of an enforceable
agreement.”) (emphasis added); McGehee v. Endeavor Acquisitions, LLC, 603
S.W.3d 515, 522 (Tex. App. 2020) (“[A] purported acceptance that changes a material
term of an offer results in a counteroffer rather than acceptance.”) (emphasis added);
Travis v. Tacoma Pub. Sch. Dist., 85 P.3d 959, 964 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (“Usually,
a purported acceptance that changes the terms of the offer in any material respect
operates only as a counteroffer and does not form a contract.”) (emphasis added).
196
PERILLO, supra note 28, at 90 (footnote omitted).
197
Kazan v. Dough Boys, Inc., 201 P.3d 508, 514–15 (Alaska 2009); see also
Appleyard v. Tigges, 114 N.Y.S.3d 627, 628 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (“Settlement agreements
are highly favored because a negotiated compromise of any dispute avoids potentially
costly, time-consuming litigation, and since the courts could not function if every
dispute resulted in a trial, a settlement helps preserve scarce judicial resources.”).
198
Capparelli v. Lopatin, 212 A.3d 979, 991 (N.J. App. Div. 2019); see also
Pearson v. Super. Ct., 136 Cal. Rptr. 3d 455, 458–59 (Ct. App. 2012) (“There is a
strong public policy in the State of California to encourage the voluntary settlement
of litigation.”).
199
Hill v. Washburne, 953 F.3d 296, 309 (5th Cir. 2020) (discussing Texas law).
200
BARKER & KENT, supra note 4, § 2.03[6][d], at 2-126.23.
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the insurer potentially becomes liable for bad faith failure to settle; or (2)
the insurer will accept and, as a result, grant the plaintiff a strategic or
tactical advantage in later bad faith litigation. Consider, for example, the
following anonymized portion of a settlement agreement in a Missouri
case where the defendant-insured’s personal auto policy had $50,000 per
person liability limits and the insurer paid those limits in settlement:
For and in consideration of the mutual promises and covenants
hereinafter recited, and by and between Plaintiff and Insured and
Insurance Company, and in further consideration of Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($50,000), plus accrued interest in the sum of $7,654.00 and
court costs of $2,345.00 paid by Insurance Company to Plaintiff for
and on behalf of Insured under the terms and conditions of its
insurance contract with Insured, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, it is hereby agreed by and between Plaintiff, Insured,
and Insurance Company:
Insured confesses judgment and has confessed judgment in the sum of
One Million Five Hundred Thousand Dollars ($1,500,000) in favor of
Plaintiff in a case now pending in the Circuit Court of Unnamed
County, Missouri, in exchange for Plaintiff’s promise that said
payment and confession of judgment will fully resolve and settle
Plaintiff’s Dispute with Insured; and
Insured agrees to pursue a claim against Insurance Company for bad
faith . . . or to assign to Plaintiff any and all claims or choses in action
. . . against Insurance Company which she may have against Insurance
Company for . . . failing to settle Plaintiff’s claim within the policy
limits of the above referenced policy; and
Insured agrees to fully cooperate in any suit (whether brought by
herself or whether there is an assignment), claim, or cause of action
against Insurance Company, including participating in and being
named as a party plaintiff in any suit or cause of action brought against
Insurance Company; and
Plaintiff covenants and agrees that that she will levy no execution of
said judgment upon the personal assets of Insured at any time, but will
look to satisfaction of the judgment solely from any proceeds of a
claim against Insurance Company for its negligence and/or bad faith
in failing to resolve Plaintiff’s claim within the policy limits [of
Insured’s policy]; and
This settlement agreement is approved as to form and content by
Insurance Company. Insurance Company covenants and agrees that
this agreement will not in any way be used as a defense to, or in
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mitigation of, any claim for damages in connection with any claim or
lawsuit asserted by Plaintiff and/or Insured for Insurance Company’s
negligence or bad faith in failing to settle Insured’s claim within the
policy limits of [the Insured’s policy]. Insurance Company covenants
and agrees not to challenge or contest any assignment of any part of
the negligence and/or bad faith claim herein referred to, and further
agrees not to assert, allege or contend that, because of any assignment,
Insured has not sustained damage or that the judgment against Insured
is not collectible as to her. Further, Insurance Company covenants and
agrees not to claim this agreement is against the public policy of the
State of Missouri and as a result is void and/or unenforceable.
***
Insurance Company agrees and understands and acknowledges that
part of the consideration of this agreement will be that in a subsequent
action . . . the jury in such subsequent action will be informed that a
one million dollar judgment was entered against Insured but that the
jury will not be informed of this agreement or of this compromise or
of the fact that by reason of this agreement Insured is not personally
exposed to liability for the judgment.201

Or, consider the scenario outlined in Columbia Insurance Co. v.
Waymer,202 a recent case arising under South Carolina law. There, Mark
Tinsley, the lawyer for the injured parties, the Reynoldses, claimed that
Columbia Insurance Co. (“CIC”) had failed to settle his clients’ claims
against CIC’s insured, Christopher Waymer, within its policy limits. 203
Tinsley later “offered CIC a ‘final chance’ to settle the case” on the
following terms:
[T]he parties would litigate the extent of the Reynoldses’ injuries as
well as the existence of bad faith on CIC’s part. If the jury found CIC
liable in bad faith, then CIC would pay whatever the jury found the
Reynoldses’ damages to be—without any right to appeal that verdict
as excessive. If the jury found CIC had not acted in bad faith, then
CIC again would owe the $1 million policy limits. Under either
option, CIC would have to waive certain defenses regarding the real

201

In Missouri, the agreement from which this language is adapted is sometimes
called a Noland v. Welch agreement. Plaintiffs contend that such agreements are
statutorily authorized. See MO. REV. STAT. § 537.065 (2021) (governing claimants’
and tortfeasors’ ability contract to limit recovery of an unliquidated claim for damages
to specified assets or an insurance contract).
202
860 F. App’x 848 (4th Cir. 2021).
203
Id. at 851.
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party in interest and the applicability of any release given by the
Reynoldses.204

Can an insurance company be required to accept a settlement offer
that obligates it to agree to a consent judgment as in the first example or
to the limitations on its right to vindicate its interests as proposed in
Waymer? If the insurer declines to accept a settlement offer containing
such terms, does it face bad faith liability for unreasonably failing to settle
the claim against its insured within its policy limits? The short and correct
answer to both questions is no.205 There are at least three good reasons for
this answer.206
First, an insurer has no duty to agree to any of these terms or to take
the demanded steps under standard insurance policy language.207 An
insurer cannot be liable for bad faith for failing to engage in some activity
or perform some action that its policy does not require.208 Second, when
it comes to settlement, insurers have no duty to pay more than their
applicable policy limits.209 Yet, paying more than its limits is what the
sort of terms discussed here effectively require of an insurer. Any
argument by a claimant that an offer to settle within policy limits coupled
with a consent judgment in excess of policy limits or some other term that
exposes an insurer to extracontractual liability is, in fact, an offer to settle

204

Id. at 852.
See, e.g., id. at 854 (affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to CIC on the related bad faith claim); Kwiatkowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 717 F. App’x
910, 913 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Kropilak v. 21st Century Ins. Co., 806 F.3d 1062,
1068 (11th Cir. 2015)); Kropilak, 806 F.3d at 1068 (citing Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co.,
896 So. 2d 665, 671 n.1 (Fla. 2004)); Dorroh v. Deerbrook Ins. Co., 223 F. Supp. 3d
1081, 1095 (E.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 751 F. App’x 980 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that the
insurer’s refusal to stipulate to an excess judgment was not bad faith as a matter of
law); Pasina v. Cal. Cas. Indem. Exch., No. 2:08-cv-01199-RCJ-RJJ, 2009 WL
10693522, at *7 (D. Nev. Nov. 4, 2009) (applying Nevada law); Berges, 896 So. 2d
at 671 n.1 (rejecting such a claim as meritless); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Miller, 212 P.3d
318, 330–31 (Nev. 2009) (stating that the insurer “had no duty to accept a stipulated
excess judgment”).
206
See ROBERT H. JERRY, II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING
INSURANCE LAW 742–43 (6th ed. 2018) (sketching out these reasons).
207
Id.
208
Manu v. GEICO Cas. Co., 798 S.E.2d 598, 606 (Va. 2017).
209
Am. Physicians Assur. Corp. v. Schmidt, 187 S.W.3d 313, 318 (Ky. 2006);
Miller, 212 P.3d at 331; Am. Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia, 876 S.W.2d 842, 849
(Tex. 1994); see also RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW LIAB. INS. § 24 cmt. h (AM. L. INST.
2019) (stating that the insurer’s duty to make reasonable settlement decisions does not
obligate it to make or accept settlement offers in excess of its policy limits).
205
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within policy limits, is at best disingenuous.210 Third, an insurer’s duty of
good faith and fair dealing cannot be stretched to compel acceptance of
the sort of terms described here because the duty of good faith and fair
dealing “cannot be used to create rights and duties not otherwise provided
for in the contract, change the contract, or insert new terms in the
contract.”211 Furthermore, and directly contrary to the type of settlement
terms discussed here, an insurer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing does
not oblige it “to place the insured’s interests above its own interests.”212
Or, as a Pennsylvania federal court once explained, the duty of good faith
and fair dealing does not compel an insurer “actively to submerge its own
interests.”213
In Waymer, the court evaluated CIC’s conduct in line with South
Carolina’s Tyger River doctrine,214 which holds that “an insurance
company must ‘sacrifice its interests in favor of’ those of the insured when
a conflict of interest as to settlement arises.”215 Even under that seemingly
demanding standard, however, CIC had no duty to accept a settlement
offer that would channel bad faith litigation.216 CIC’s duty to sacrifice its
own interests to protect Waymer under the Tyger River doctrine did not
require CIC to subvert its interests to his, but merely distilled to the
established requirement that it settle the Reynoldses’ claim “if that was the
reasonable thing to do.”217 But settling on Tinsley’s terms was not a
210

Kropilak, 806 F.3d at 1068.
JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 206, at 743.
212
Kim v. Allstate Ins. Co., 223 P.3d 1180, 1192 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
213
Kosierowski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 51 F. Supp. 2d 583, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
214
See Tyger River Pine Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 170 S.E. 346, 348 (S.C. 1933)
(“If, in the effort to do this, [the insurer’s] own interests conflicted with those of
respondent, it was bound, under its contract of indemnity, and in good faith, to
sacrifice its interests in favor of those of the respondent.”).
215
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Waymer, 860 F. App’x 848, 852 (4th Cir. 2021)
(quoting Columbia Ins. Co. v. Reynolds, 438 F. Supp. 3d 614, 620 (D.S.C. 2020)).
216
Id.
217
Tyger River, 170 S.E. at 349; see Waymer, 860 F. App’x at 852 (quoting the
district court using similar language). The Missouri Supreme Court has also described
an insurer’s duty of good faith and fair dealing as requiring it to sacrifice its own
interests when weighing settlement within policy limits in a case of probable excess
liability based on Tyger River. Zumwalt v. Utils. Ins. Co., 228 S.W.2d 750, 756 (Mo.
1950) (quoting Tyger River, 170 S.E. at 348). But this means only “that the insurer
cannot elevate its own interests over the insured’s; to the extent the insurer might be
tempted to do so, it must ‘sacrifice’ its own interests so that they are back in balance
with the insured’s.” JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 206, at 734 n.284. Missouri
caselaw after Zumwalt clarifies that this interpretation of the “sacrifice” requirement
is correct. See, e.g., Landie v. Century Indem. Co., 390 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1965) (“[W]here the [insurance] company in good faith believes there is a valid
211
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reasonable course of action. In fact, the terms that Tinsley proposed on
the Reynoldses’ behalf that would have subjected CIC to bad faith
litigation with at least one hand tied behind its back provided CIC with an
objectively reasonable basis for refusing the offer.218 CIC therefore
prevailed on Waymer’s bad faith claim.219

V. CONCLUSION
Liability insurers routinely settle claims and lawsuits against their
insureds. The settlement process follows a typical contract path of offer
and acceptance leading to a settlement agreement. But plaintiffs’
settlement offers are sometimes vague and in other cases intended
acceptances may become counteroffers if the insurance company does not
comply with the mirror image rule. In yet other cases, the plaintiff’s focus
is not on settlement of the case at hand but instead on crafting offers to
facilitate subsequent bad faith litigation against the insurer. In any event,
lawyers and litigants need to understand the contractual aspects of
settlement because they are essential to the resolution of all cases and
claims, as well as to the creation or avoidance of bad faith liability.

defense to the claim, even though the defense proves unsuccessful and results in a
judgment against the insured above the policy limits, the company is not liable,
because of such honest mistake, beyond the limits of its policy.”).
218
Waymer, 860 F. App’x at 855.
219
Id. (affirming summary judgment for CIC).
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